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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this thesis was to find a suitable, cost efficient and easy-to-use 
secure remote access solution for the Andritz Group. Currently these secure re-
mote connections are provided using Check Point IPsec VPN connections. How-
ever, there is a need for more precise access restriction and a cut in management 
costs. Because of these reasons Andritz Group piloted products of the Juniper 
Networks Secure Access series. Secondary reasons for choosing Juniper SSL VPN 
were the market leading technology offered by Juniper and previous co-operation 
with Juniper Networks.  
There are several ways to provide users with secure remote connection to the 
company network. One way could be a leased line between the home office and 
the company network. However, leased lines are expensive and if users are re-
quired to work in different locations leased line connetions are useless. Two other 
ways to create secure remote connection are IPsec VPN and SSL VPN solutions. 
These two use shared media, normally Internet, to create a connection between the 
client and the company network. Traffic is normally tunnelled or used via a device 
which acts as a gateway to the company network. IPsec VPN and SSL VPN solu-
tions are far more cost efficient than leased lines and also multi-user capable. 
The main requirements for the Andritz Group remote connections are high secu-
rity, data integrity with strong user and device authentication. Because of this, 
certificates and virus protection software checks are used for connecting devices. 
If the client computer does not pass these tests, only limited access to the com-
pany’s resources is granted. In addition to ensuring users identity, AD authentica-
tion and one-time-password are used for two-factor authentication.  
SSL VPN was selected as a new secure remote access solution for the Andritz 
Group. The decision to change the functional IPsec VPN solution to SSL VPN 
was done mainly because of monetary, as well as administrative reasons. Check 
Point VPN requires client software to be installed to each computer that might 
need secure remote connection. Juniper SSL VPN, on the other hand, works by 
using a number of logged-in users. Because no installation of client software is 
required, administrative overhead is also reduced. 
The Current AD structure and variety of applications used by the Andritz Group 
caused the biggest challenges in this project. However, these problems were 
solved in co-operation between the workstation, network and application depart-
ments. As a final outcome the company acquired a functional, strictly controllable 
and redundant remote access environment. 
Key words: SSL VPN, Juniper Networks Secure Access, Check Point IPsec VPN 
Lahden Ammattikorkeakoulu 
Tietotekniikan koulutusohjelma 
ERONEN, ERPO:   Yrityksen etäkäyttöyhteys 
 
Tietoliikennetekniikan opinnäytetyö  68 sivua, 0 liitesivua 
Kevät 2009 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoitus on saada aikaan kustannustehokas, helppokäyt-
töinen ja Andritz Groupin tarpeisiin soveltuva turvallinen etäkäyttöratkaisu. Tähän 
asti etäkäyttöyhteydet on toteutettu käyttämällä Check Pointin IPsec VPN- 
ratkaisua, joka muodostaa suoran VPN-tunnelin asiakastietokoneen ja yritysver-
kon välille. Andritzin yritysverkossa on kuitenkin viime aikoina ilmennyt tarvetta 
tarkempaan verkkoresurssien rajoitukseen ja hallinnointikustannusten leikkauk-
seen. Näiden uusien tarpeiden ja onnistuneen aikaisemman yhteistyön johdosta 
Andritz Group pilotoi Juniperin Networksin Secure Access tuoteperheen laitteita, 
jotka valittiin Andritz Groupin SSL VPN -ratkaisuksi.  
Turvallinen etäkäyttöyhteys voidaan toteuttaa usealla eri tavalla. Näihin kuuluvat 
kiinteät verkkoyhteydet yrityksen konttorin ja kotikonttorin välille sekä erilaiset 
VPN-yhteydet käyttäjän ja yrityksen verkon välillä. Koska kiinteät linjat ovat 
kalliita eivätkä palvele liikkuvaa toimistoa, on yritykselle hyödyllisempää toteut-
taa etäkäyttö VPN-yhteyksillä. VPN-yhteydet käyttävät hyväkseen olemassa olevia 
verkkoja, kuten internettiä, luodakseen yhteyden työntekijän ja yrityksen verkon 
välille. VPN-yhteydet mahdollistavat koko liikenteen tunnelointiin, tai vain tietyn 
palvelun käytön välittäjä laitteen kautta. Lisäksi IPsec- ja SSL VPN-sovellukset 
ovat kiinteitä linjoja halvempia ja mahdollistavat mobiilin etäyhteyden usealla 
käyttäjälle samanaikaisesti. 
Tärkeimmät vaatimukset Andritz Groupin etäkäyttöratkaisulle ovat korkea tieto-
turva, tiedon eheys sekä vahva käyttäjän ja päätelaitteen autentikointi. Tästä 
johtuen Andritzin etäkäyttö sovellus tarkistaa käyttäjän koneelta sertifikaatin ja 
virusten torjunta ohjelman ajantasaisuuden ja testien vaillinainen läpäisy rajoittaa 
käyttäjälle annetuja oikeuksia. Tämän lisäksi käyttäjät tunnistetaan käyttäen kahta 
eri tunnistusmenetelmää; AD-tunnistusta ja kertakäyttösalasanaa, jolloin varmis-
tutaan käyttäjän oikeellisuudesta.  
SSL VPN valittiin Andritzin uudeksi etäkäyttöstandardiksi sekä kustannusten, että 
hallinnollisten syiden takia. Kustannussäästöjä tuo erityisesti Juniperin 
yhtäaikaisten käyttäjien määrään perustuva laskutus, kun taas Check Pointin VPN- 
ratkaisussa kaikkiin Andritz Groupin kannettaviin tietokoneisiin olisi tarvinnut 
ostaa erillinen VPN-lisenssi. Hallinnoinnin määrää voidaan vähentää, koska SSL 
VPN:n ei vaadi erillisen ohjelman asennusta. 
Projektin suurimmat ongelmat aiheutuivat Andritzin AD rakenteesta ja yrityksen 
käytössä olevien eri ohjelmien yhteensopivuudesta SSL VPN:n laitteiston kanssa. 
Nämä ongelmat on kuitenkin pääosin ratkaistu, ja nyt meillä on käytössämme 
toimiva, helposti hallittava ja redundanttinen etäkäyttö ratkaisu. 
Avainsanat: SSL VPN, Juniper Networks Secure Access, Check Point IPsec VPN 
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ABBREVIATION LIST 
 
AD Active Directory is technology created by Microsoft, which pro- 
 vides variety of network services including: LDAP, Kerberos au- 
 thentication and DNS-based naming 
 
ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line, is network connection met- 
 hod that uses phonelines for transferring data 
 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard, is one of many block cipher 
 methods 
 
AH Authentication Header, is authentication header of IPsec protocol 
 
ARPANET  Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, is network used by  
 United States Department of Defense 
 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode, is an electronic digital data trans- 
 mission technology 
 
CA Certificate Authority, usually some trusted third party who grants 
the certificate for requester 
 
CPE Customer Premises Equipment, device used to connect to the net- 
 work e.g. ADSL modem 
  
CRL Certificate Revocation List, list of certificates no longer valid 
 
CSU/DSU Channel Service Unit/Data Service Unit, device used to connect- 
 ing router to the T1 or E1 connector 
 
DCE Data Communications Equipment, e.g. ADSL modem 
 
DES Data Encryption Standard, a symmetric block cipher method 
 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, network protocol which 
 is used to hand out IP addresses 
 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone, part of communications network, which al- 
 lows logical connections from the internet 
 
DoS Denial of Service, network attack which aims in paralyzing the 
 network 
 
DTE Data Terminal Equipment, end point device which is trying to  
 connect the network 
 
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload, used to encrypt IPsec protocol  
 information 
 
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code, one of many keyed hash  
 functions 
 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol, networking protocol used by web  
 browsers 
 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure, combination of HTTP and  
 network security protocol 
 
ICV Integrity check value, a fixed size block of data which is used to  
 ensure data integrity 
 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force, group of people responsible for 
 standards used in internetworks 
 
IKE Internet Key Exchange, secure key exchange protocol used to cre- 
 ate security associations in the IPsec protocol suite 
 IP Internet Protocol, networking protocol used in TCP/IP networks 
 
IPsec Internet Protocol Security, tunneling protocol commonly used in  
 internetworks 
 
ISAKMP Internet Key Exchange and Key Management Protocol, commonly 
 used key exchange protocol 
 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
 
IVE Instant Virtual Extranet, operating system used by Juniper Net- 
 works Secure Access product family 
 
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol, tunneling protocol used to support  
 Virtual Private Networks 
 
LAN Local Area Network, computer network covering a small physical 
 area 
 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, application protocol for  
 querying and modifying directory services running over TCP/IP 
 
MAC Message Authentication Code, a short piece of information used  
 to authenticate a message 
 
MD5 Message-Digest algorithm 5, widely used cryptographic hash  
 function 
 
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching, highly scalable, protocol agnostic,  
 data-carrying mechanism 
NAC Network Access Control, an approach to computer network secu- 
 rity that attempts to unify endpoint security 
 
NAT Network Address Translation, address translation technique 
 
NTLM NT LAN Manager, Microsoft authentication protocol used with  
 the SMB protocol 
 
OSI Open System Interconnection Reference Modole, layered model  
 of networking protocols 
 
OTP One-Time-Password, secure password method used for more se- 
 cure user authentication 
 
PC Personal Computer 
 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure, set of hardware, software, people and  
 policies and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distrib- 
 ute, and revoke digital certificates 
 
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol, data link protocol, commonly used to  
 establish a direct connection between two networking nodes 
 
PSE Packet Switching Exchange, device used to connect DCEs and  
 DTEs inside a X.25 network 
 
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network 
 
PVC Permanent Virtual Circuits 
 
RA Registration Authority, authority who receives an application for a  
 certificate, works as a middle man between certificate requester  
 and CA 
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service, protocol used to  
 authenticate the users 
 
RC4 Rivest Cipher 4, most widely known stream cipher, it is used in  
 popular protocols such as SSL, designed by Ron Rivest 
 
RFC Request For Comments, collection of internet standard published  
 by IETF 
 
SA Secure Access, Juniper Networks SSL VPN product family 
 
SA Security Accosiation, trust relationship generated between two  
 systems 
 
SAM Secure Application Manager, solution used by Juniper Networks  
 SSL VPN, to allow user to connect and operate a single applica- 
 tion 
 
SMS System Management Server, centralized management software  
 developed by Microsoft 
 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, mail transfer protocol that uses the  
 TCP protocol 
 
SPI Security Parameter Index 
 
SSL Secure Sockets Layer, data encryption protocol 
 
SVC Switched Virtual Circuit, temporary route in X.25 network 
 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol, connection oriented data transfer  
 protocol 
 
TLS Transport Layer Security, data encryption protocol offspring of  
 SSL 
 
TTP Trusted Third Party, external agent trusted by both parties 
 
UI User Interface 
 
VA Validation Authority, authority used to check authenticity of used  
 certificates 
 
WAN Wide Area Network, geographically significant network 
 
VC Virtual Circuit, technique used by X.25, Frame Relay and ATM  
 networks 
 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
 
XOR Exclusive OR, a type of logical disjunction on two operands that  
 results in a value of true if and only if exactly one of the operands  
 has a value of true 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Working from home or outside of the office has become more common since high 
speed internet connections have become more popular. Users are able to connect 
to their company’s network and receive all the services like they would be able to 
inside the office. Due to increased popularity of high speed internet connections it 
makes sense to perform some of the required tasks from home, without the need to 
travel to the office in the middle of the night or early in the morning if something 
urgent is needed to be done. 
 
The Andritz Group has a growing need for more restricted secure remote connec-
tion. Because of this need the original IPsec VPN (Internet Protocol secure Virtual 
Private Network) remote access solutions must be replaced with SSL VPN (Se-
cure Sockets Layer Virtual Private Network) connections, which will allow the 
company to perform more detailed access restriction. Although there are several 
ways to provide secure remote access for a single user, none of these have the 
level of access control or ease of access that an SSL VPN solution provides.   
 
The main goal of this thesis is to find and configure a scalable and cost efficient 
secure remote connection environment for the Andritz Group global network to 
replace the Check Point secure client solution they already have. A secondary goal 
is to find suitable host check requirements for the Andritz Group’s internal users, 
subcontractors and business partners, in order to block insecure computers from 
accessing the company network.  
 
Due to the highly classified nature of data used by remote users in the Andritz 
Group, this thesis also looks into strong user authentication solutions to be used in 
the Andritz Group SSL VPN. As users have different habits there should be at 
least a couple of different ways to perform the strong authentication. Since end 
users are not always that familiar with these kinds of applications it is crucial that 
the SSL VPN environment is easy for the end user to understand and use. 
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2 VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK 
2.1 Virtual Private Networks in general 
 
VPN (Virtual Private Network) is described as a telecommunications network 
built for a company’s personal use which overlays on a public network infrastruc-
ture, in most cases the Internet, as shown in FIGURE 1. The Public network infra-
structure can also be physical leased line or a VC network (Virtual Circuit). VPN 
has two main topologies, site-to-site VPN and remote access VPN. (Perlmutter & 
Zarkower 2001, 10). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. VPN over the Internet (Advanced technologies : VPN 2005). 
 
Services based on VCs such as X.25, Frame Relay and ATM (Asynchronous 
Transfer Mode) are different from VPN over the Internet because in these solu-
tions data has been made invisible to others in the Data Link layer and Network 
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layer of the OSI model (Open System Interconnection) a firewall is not necessarily 
required. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 11). 
 
Another way of transferring data which covers all the definitions of Virtual Private 
Networking is leased line. A single leased line that is used to connect the remote 
office to the company network. These kinds of connections, as well as previously 
mentioned X.25, Frame Relay and ATM connetions, are expensive compared to a 
VPN tunnel built over the Internet. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 11). 
 
VPN connections use different layers of the OSI model to provide secure network-
ing. For example leased physical lines are located on the first layer of the OSI 
model (also called physical layer), packet switched connections, such as Frame 
Relay and X.25 use data link layer of the OSI model. IPsec (Internet Protocol se-
curity) VPN uses an Internet layer of the Internet protocol suite which is roughly 
the same as the Network layer of the OSI model. VPN solutions like SSL VPN 
(Secure Sockets Layer VPN) use OSI layers from four till seven. (Wikipedia – 
SSL VPN 2009) (Wikipedia - Frame Relay 2009). 
 
VPN traffic between CPE devices (Customer Premises Equipment) is tunneled. In 
its simplest form tunneling is encapsulating data packets inside each other. It is 
also possible to add features like encryption, integrity check, sender verification, 
address translation or packing of data when encapsulating data packets. (Perlmut-
ter & Zarkower 2001, 11, 12). 
2.2 VPN topologies  
 
Virtual private networking has two main applications: Site-to-Site VPN and VPN 
remote access. Remote access VPN users connect to the company network via 
VPN remote access as shown in FIGURE 2. VPN remote access requires the VPN 
device, normally a firewall or router, and some software or VPN key on the cli-
ent’s computer to handle user authentication and to create the secure tunnel over 
the public network. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 12, 48). 
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FIGURE 2. VPN remote access (Phifer 2001).  
 
Another quite common VPN application is Site-to-Site VPN. In Site-to-Site VPN 
a secure tunnel is created for transferring files and other forms of data securely 
between two or more corporate LANs (Local Area Network), as shown in 
FIGURE 3. (Phifer 2001). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Site-to-Site VPN (Phifer 2001). 
 
Point-to-Point connections between different offices are normally provided by a 
network layer of the OSI model. Generally Point-to-Point connections are created 
between firewalls or routers; encryption of traffic is done by a secret key or cer-
tificate. Certificates are a less complicated way of encryption and generally con-
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sidered more secure than applying the same password for all the routers and fire-
walls of the network. In order for VPN to work, it is required to provide subnets 
used for VPN connections to the router or firewall responsible for the VPN con-
netion. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 12; Phifer 2001). 
 
It is common to have to authenticate both the user and the computer used for a 
VPN connection before a person is granted access to a virtual private network. 
User authentication is most commonly done by checking user credentials from the 
authentication server. For this process the RADIUS protocol is normally used. 
There are also many other ways to perform user authentication, many of which are 
more secure than password authentication. These methods are covered more thor-
oughly in chapter 4. (Wikipedia – Authentication 2009). 
2.3 Data encryption and decryption 
 
The main concerns of virtual private networking are encryption of outbound traf-
fic, user authentication and authentication of devices used to remotely access 
company’s resources. Authentication is used to verify the identity of people and 
devices participating in the secure remote connection session. If authentication is 
done properly it reduces the possibility of data theft. Well encrypted VPN traffic is 
worthless if the person who tries to interpret it does not posses the key required to 
decrypt the message. There are two generally used ways of encrypting the data: 
symmetric and asymmetric keying. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 12,106). 
 
Symmetric key algorithms are a class of algorithms for cryptography that use tri-
vially related, often identical cryptographic keys for both encryption and decryp-
tion. In order to successfully encrypt and decrypt data using symmetric key algo-
rithms, both sender and receiver need to have knowledge of the keys to be used. 
Symmetric key algorithms can be devided into two groups, the one being stream 
ciphers and the other being block ciphers. (Wikipedia – Symmetric-key algorithm 
2009). 
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Stream cipher techniques encrypt bits of the message one at a time and therefore 
stream cipher is executed faster and with lower hardware complexity than block 
cipher. Stream cipher typically uses XOR operation (Exclusive-OR) to mix plain 
text message with cipher bit stream, which may appear random but actually is not. 
Stream cipher is normally used in applications where the length of the plain text is 
not known beforehand, such as secure wireless connections. The most commonly 
used software planted stream cipher is the RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) designed by Ron 
Rivest in the late 1980s while he was working for RSA Security. (Wikipedia - 
Stream cipher 2009). 
 
In block cipher, data is encrypted as fixed-length blocks, for example 128 bits at a 
time. These blocks are encrypted one by one using a secret key and sent to the 
receiver. After data has been transferred, the receiver can decrypt the data using a 
secret key. The most widely known block ciphers are DES (Data Encryption Stan-
dard), Blowfish and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). AES 256-bit is the 
most commonly used block cipher today. (Connected: An Internet Encyclopedia 
2009). 
 
Asymmetric key cryptography also known as public key cryptography uses two 
types of keys. Each person creates a public key that can be used to send encrypted 
information to this person, and also a private key which can be used to decrypt 
messages encrypted by the person’s public key. Information encrypted with a pub-
lic key must be decrypted with the corresponding private key, which makes it im-
possible for anunauthorized third party to decipher private messages sent to the 
possessor of the private key. Many companies have tried to create superior asym-
metric keying techniques that would become a standard of asymmetric keying but 
so far no such technique has been released. Probably the best-known application 
of asymmetric cryptography is RSA keys. For more information, see chapter 4.3 
one-time-password. (Wikipedia - Public-key cryptography 2009). 
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2.4 Integrity of the data 
 
Cryptographic hash funtions can be used in many applications. They work as a 
checksum for sent data. Hash functions can be used in authentication and they can 
work as digital fingerprints for detecting duplicate data files. In networking, hash 
functions are commonly used to assure data integrity. Cryptographic hash function 
takes an arbitrary block of data and returns a fixed-size bit string called the hash 
value. Cryptographic hash function is based on the hash value of data block and an 
assumption that if data has been tempered during the transfer its hash value has 
also changed. The sending device calculates the hash value and adds it to the 
package. After transfer has completed receiving, the device checks that the value 
of the hash has not changed during the transfer. If hash values do not match, in-
formation is discarded. (Wikipedia - Cryptographic hash function 2009). 
 
The fact that hash funtions are fixed-length sometimes causes collisions. This 
happens when hash values generated for two strings of data are identical. Superi-
ority of cryptographic hash functions is determined by comparing the amount of 
collisions generated. A hash function that is less likely to cause collisions is better 
than one which causes more collisions. The most commonly used cryptographic 
hash functions are SHA-1 and MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5). (Wikipedia - 
Cryptographic hash function 2009). 
 
 There are also keyed hash functions, where only person who knows the key can 
count the hash value. Keyed hash funtions create hash values based on data and a 
secret key provided by the user, as shown in FIGURE 4. (Wikipedia - Crypto-
graphic hash function 2009). 
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FIGURE 4. Keyed hash function (Wikipedia - Message authentication code 2007). 
 
After a message is sent and received, the person who opens the message is 
prompted for the secret key used to generate the hash. After the key is provided, 
the system compares two MACs (Message Authentication Code) to each other and 
if they match, the message is successfully authenticated. HMAC is a commonly 
used keyed hash function, which is based on MAC, but because HMAC encryp-
tion is harder to crack it is more commonly used than its predecessor. (Wikipedia - 
Cryptographic hash function 2009). 
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3  VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKING TECHNIQUES 
3.1 OSI layer 1 VPN solutions 
 
The physical layer of the OSI model provides a VPN solution that is considered 
the golden standard of Virtual Private Networking, a physical network line be-
tween two places. Physical lines presented in FIGURE 5 are normally leased from 
the local phone company to connect two offices or an office and a home office. 
Client companies are able to choose between the clear channel T1 connection with 
transfer rate of 1.544Mbit/s and channeled E1 connection with transfer rate of 
2.048Mbit/s. These days there are many more transfer rates available. These solu-
tions also provide the invariable bandwith and latency which are also definitions 
for the golden standard of Virtual Private Networking. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 
2001, 35). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Physical leased line 
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While using a clear channel T1 connection, two physical connections, two 
CSU/DSU devices (Channel Service Unit/Data Service Unit) and two ports from 
the network router are required. A CSU/DSU device provides time synchroniza-
tion, framing and signal to data conversion services of leased T1/E1 lines. When a 
channeled E1 connection is used, one physical connection, one CSU/DSU device 
and one port from network a router are required. The type of connection is de-
pendant from the ISP’s (Internet Service Provider) way of delivering network 
connection. ISPs in North America, Korea and Japan provide leased lines using T-
carriers whereas E-carriers are commonly used in Europe. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 
2001, 38). 
 
Lately, leased physical lines have lost their standing on markets against VPN over 
thr Internet solutions, which is mainly because VPN solutions over the internet are 
more cost efficient and easy to set up. In rural areas such as China, it can take up 
to two months for a company to get a physical line or MPLS connectivity between 
two places whereas VPN over the Internet can be operational the next day. 
(Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 40; China Telecom 2008). 
3.2 Public Switched Telephone Networks 
 
Public switched telephone networks, also known as PSTNs are a commonly used 
solution for a remote user to access the company network. In PSTNs the connec-
tion is made between the client’s modem and the modem in the company network. 
The modems are used to transform a digital signal into analog form, so it can be 
transmited via an analog telephone network. To create this connection either a 
Dial-up networking or Point-to-Point Protocol, later referred to as PPP, is used. 
(Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 49). 
 
In Dial-up networking packets are transferred using the Internet Protocol, later 
referred to as IP. In PPP the user gets to choose which data transfer protocol will 
be used, after the connection has been established. PPP can also provide connec-
tion authentication, transmission encryption and data compression, which makes it 
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more secure than Dial-up Networking. PSTN is extremely suitable for rural areas, 
since the only requirement for the connection is finding a phone line, which 
should be possible almost anywere in the world. (Wikipedia - Public Switched 
Telephone Network 2009).  
3.3 Packet Switched Networks 
 
ARPANET, also known as Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, devel-
oped by the United States Department of Defence was the first packed switched 
network and it became operational in 1969. However, the first widely used packet 
switched network standard X.25 was not released until 1973. X.25 is an ITU-T 
standard network layer protocol for packet switched wide area network communi-
cation. (Wikipedia - Packet Switched Network 2009). 
 
The X.25 standard defines the interface between a subscriber DTE (Data terminal 
Equipment) and an X.25 network DCE (Data Communications Equipment). In 
X.25 networks the DCE is normally a router and the DTE is normally a client PC. 
Routing between the DCEs is done via a group of PSE (Packet switching ex-
change) devices, as shown in FIGURE 6. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 41). 
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FIGURE 6. X.25 Wide area network topology (Wikipedia – X.25 2009). 
 
A physical X.25 network is the same for all users, but inside the network VCs are 
used to create VPN type tunnels between the client networks. This way the clients 
only have an access to their own data. There are two types of VCs: SVCs 
(Switched virtual circuits) which are temporary, and PVCs (Permanent virtual 
circuits) which are permanent. Companies normally have one so-called virtual 
circuit end point, to which all other virtual circuits terminate. (Perlmutter & 
Zarkower 2001, 42). 
 
The price of X.25, Frame Relay, and ATM connections is considerably lower than 
the cost of leased lines, because in these networks the costs can be devided be-
tween different users. However, in VC networks such as X.25, Frame Relay, and 
ATM the Internet Service Provider, also known as ISP, is responsible for routing 
the information inside the PSE field, and has to make sure that the data is not 
routed to a wrong network. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 43). 
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3.4 IPsec 
 
IPsec (Internet Protocol security) is a framework of open standards for protecting 
communications over IP (Internet Protocol) networks through the use of crypto-
graphic security services. IPsec supports network-level peer authentication, data 
origin authentication, data integrity, data confidentiality, and replay protection. 
IPsec is dual a mode, end-to-end security scheme operating at the Internet layer of 
the Internet Protocol Suite. IPsec is a modern standard which does not require any 
measures from users after the initial sign-in process. After the IPsec connection 
has been formed, network traffic will be tunneled securely over the IP network. 
(Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 42; Wikipedia – IPsec 2009). 
 
IPsec was first announced by IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) in August of 
1995 in the RFC document (Request for Comments) 1825 called Security Archi-
tecture for the Internet Protocol. Defining the IPsec made it possible for different 
vendors to start producing hardware independent solutions for secure networking. 
IPsec is based on three basic factors: authentication, encryption and key manage-
ment. Even though many application and device manufacturers have their own 
solutions for the IPsec key management, it is most commonly based on the IKE 
protocol (Internet Key Exchange). Key management is a procedure where used 
encryption keys are negotiated or determined by the connecting parties. IPsec is 
designed to only authenticate devices used in connection, not the users. (Perlmut-
ter & Zarkower 2001, 106). 
 
IPsec has two modes of operation: the transport mode and the tunnel mode. In 
transport mode, only the payload of the IP packet is authenticated and/or en-
crypted. The routing of the packet stays the same, since the IP header is not modi-
fied or encrypted; however, while using the AH (Authentication Header), the IP 
addresses cannot be translated because this would invalidate the hash value. In 
transport mode the transport and application layers are always secured by hash, 
and therefore they cannot be modified. The transport mode is used for host-to-host 
communications. In a tunnel mode, the whole IP packet is authenticated and/or 
encrypted. Afterwards, the IP packet is encapsulated into a new IP packet with a 
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new header. To create virtual private networks for site-to-site, remote access con-
nections and host-to-host communications a tunnel mode is used. (Wikipedia – 
IPsec 2009). 
 
IPsec works as a framework for secure connection. Inside the frame different types 
of algorithms and parameters can be selected. In order to set up a functional IPsec 
connection between two places, it is required that corresponding parameters and 
algorithms are used in both ends of the connection. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 
106). 
3.4.1 IPsec authentication header 
 
IPsec adds an AH field to a normal IP message, as shown in FIGURE 7. IPsec also 
changes the value of the frame’s IP header to 51, which indicates that IPsec AH is 
used. The purpose of the AH is to guarantee connectionless integrity and data ori-
gin authentication of the IP packets. AHs can also be used to protect the connec-
tion against the replay attacks. This is done by using the sliding window technique 
and discarding old packets. The sliding window protocol works on a data link and 
transport layers of the OSI model. It is used to keep a record of the frame se-
quences sent and the respective acknowledgements received by both users. (RFC 
2402 – Kent & Atkinson 1998, 1, 2). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. IP message without and with Authentication Header 
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FIGURE 8. Authentication header (The TCP/IP guide 2005). 
 
The structure of AH is presented above in FIGURE 8. Authentication data field is 
the main component of an AH and it has variable length containing the ICV (In-
tegrity Check Value) that is used to authenticate the packet. It may also contain 
padding. Authentication Data field, as well as the whole AH must be a multiple of 
32bits while using the IPv4 (Internet protocol version 4). When using IPv6 (Inter-
net Protocol version 6) the length of the AH must be a multiple of 64 bits. (The 
TCP/IP guide 2005). 
3.4.2 Encapsulating Security Payload 
 
Another member of the IPsec protocol suite is ESP. ESP offers origin authenticity, 
integrity, and confidentiality protection of packets. ESP supports both encryption-
only and authentication-only configurations, but using both encryption and authen-
tication is recommended in order to achieve maximum security. IP packet header 
protection included in AH is not on the ESP’s feature list. In a tunneled mode the 
whole inner packet is encapsulated, including the IP packet header, while the outer 
most header stays unprotected. Using ESP gives the IP packets a protocol number 
50. (Wikipedia – Encapsulating Security Payload 2009). 
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FIGURE 9. IP message with and without ESP (FIDIS – internet layer protocols 
2007). 
 
Using an ESP extends the IP-message frame by three additional fields as shown in 
FIGURE 9. Information between the ESP header and the ESP trailer is encrypted. 
In addition, the ESP performs integrity check for sent messages. The structure of 
an ESP packet is presented in FIGURE 10. (RFC 2406 – Kent & Atkinson 1998, 
3). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10. ESP packet diagram (RFC 2406 – Kent & Atkinson 1998, 2). 
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3.4.3 Security association 
 
SA (security association) is the establishment of shared security information be-
tween two network entities to support secure communication; it is the core of an 
IPsec connection. SA may include cryptographic keys, initialization vectors or 
digital certificates. SAs are defined by a set of three parameters, called a triple. 
These three are: an SPI (Security Parameter Index), an IP destination address and a 
security protocol identifier. An IP destination address is the IP address of the de-
vice whose SA is established. (Wikipedia – Security Association 2008). 
 
An SPI is a 32-bit number chosen to uniquely identify an SA for any connected 
device. The SPI is located inside the AH or ESP datagram and thus links each 
secure datagram to the SA. The SPI determines the integrity check of algorithm, 
encryption algorithm, algorithm key(s), and lease time for created key(s), algo-
rithm lifetime and list of the IP addresses allowed to connect to the system. SPI 
services used can be personalized for each case, which makes it possible to ex-
clude services that are not required. After an SPI is created it is saved to the SPI 
field of the packet. (RFC 2401 – Kent & Atkinson 1998, 20). 
 
A functional IPsec connection requires exchange of SPI information between con-
necting devices. SA is normally a one-way channel, but if the connecting devices 
are required to change information between each other and two-way channels are 
used, both devices need to have a unique SPI in order to successfully complete the 
process. If the connecting devices use different protocols, for example AH and 
ESP, additional SPIs are required, which gives a total number of four SPIs. (RFC 
2401 – Kent & Atkinson 1998, 20, 21). 
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3.4.4 IPsec Keying 
 
IPsec key management is normally done using the IKE protocol, but there are also 
other solutions developed by device and application manufacturers. Failure to in-
tegrate IPsec key management solutions as one has slowed down the spread of 
IPsec. The IKE protocol is the latest step in the evolution of IPsec key manage-
ment, succeeding the Oakley and ISAKMP protocols. IKEv1 was developed be-
cause of the complexity of ISAKMP, but it too remained rather complex. Com-
plexity of protocol was not solved until in IKEv2 which was much more, straight-
forward than its predecessor. The purpose of the IKE protocol is to negotiate, and 
provide authenticated keying material for security associations in a protected 
manner. IKE is a hybrid protocol combining ISAKMP, Oakley and SKME proto-
cols previously used for internet key exchange. The medium which IPsec connec-
tions are built on are normally insecure (e.g. Internet), therefore extra caution 
should be taken to ensure secure key exchange. In order to provide the secure key 
exchange, IKE uses the asymmetric Diffie-Hellman protocol, which allowes con-
nected parties to negotiate a symmetric key used for encrypting the messages. IKE 
also supports certificate based authentication for connecting devices. (RFC 2409 – 
Harkins & Carrel 1998, 1, 4). 
 
IKEv2 was released in December of 2005 in order to improve support for mobile 
devices and to provide general upgrades for the protocol. The biggest improve-
ments compared to IKEv1 included improved resilience towards DOS (Denial of 
Service) attacks, reliability and state management, and standard mobility support. 
Standard mobility support is an extension for IKEv2 called MOBIKE, which pro-
vides IKEv2 and IPsec services for mobile and multihomed users. In IKEv1 there 
was a possibility of a dead state situation; this is encountered when both parties 
expected the other to initiate an action, which never eventuated. Reliability and 
state management service were added to IKEv2 to prevent dead state problems. 
Only the most important fixes and new features introduced by IKEv2 were cov-
ered in this chapter. (Wikipedia – Internet Key Exchange 2009). 
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3.4.5 IPsec VPN 
 
An IPsec connection always has two parties: sender and receiver. The relationship 
between sender and receiver is called Security association (SA). SA is created by 
allocating sender and receiver the keys used for protecting the connection. These 
keys can be generated either statically or dynamically, by using one of the IPsec 
key exchange protocols. After both parties receive keys the SA is created. Connec-
tion between the parties involved in security association is always provided by the 
network layer of the OSI model. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 109). 
 
When information is sent using an AH, the sender signs information with a private 
key created during the security association process. Security associated packets 
can be opened with the receiver’s secret key. If ESP is used, the whole message is 
encrypted using an algorithm decided by connecting parties. After the encrypted 
message has been received, it will be decrypted using a reversal algorithm to the 
one it was encrypted with. As a result a clear text packet is received. Using AH 
prevents IPsec VPN traffic passing through NAT (Network address translation), 
because AH performs integrity check for IP addresses as well as data. (Perlmutter 
& Zarkower 2001, 109, 110). 
 
IPsec VPN solutions normally combine VPN devices and VPN applications, be-
tween which the VPN connection is established. The VPN device is normally a 
server or a firewall that is located in the company’s own premises. VPN applica-
tion on the other hand is a piece of software running in a remote computer which 
is trying to connect to the corporate network. Site-to-Site VPN connections are 
normally done using a VPN device in both ends of the line. VPN remote connect 
favors application-based on VPN solution with VPN device at the other end. Host-
ing several simultaneous IPsec connections can be consuming for the VPN device, 
because it is required to calculate and keep track of many different keys and algo-
rithms. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 112). 
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IPsec is a protocol which has built-in encryption tools, but it does not use a spe-
cific encryption algorithm, which makes it more flexible to use, since the user can 
choose the algorithm used to encrypt the data. Only the form of the encryption 
algorithm is determined by the IPsec protocol. This characteristic makes the IPsec 
protocol suite an easy base for creating new applications and devices, since there 
is no problem with compatibility. The IPsec protocol being well integrated into the 
IP protocol makes IPsec solutions easy to implement and use. (Perlmutter & 
Zarkower 2001, 113). 
 
The fact that IPsec is integrated to IP protocol makes it incompatible with most of 
the other network protocols, which may in some situations cause extra work for 
the network administrator. However, this can be solved by tunneling the traffic 
first inside the IP packet and afterwards for IPsec. Even though IPsec is well stan-
dardized there are still some compliance issues between IPsec solutions provided 
by different vendors. IPsec only provides tools for authenticating the devices used 
to connect, for user authentication separate authentication methods must be used. 
(Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 113). 
 
IPsec VPN applications normally require installing a piece of software to the cli-
ent computer. In corporate networks where there might be hundreds or thousands 
of remote users, this means lots of work. IPsec is not fully compatible with Net-
work Address Translation, also known as NAT, which adds some more problems 
to the equation. Since IPsec connections are always created on a network layer, it 
is a prominent platform for viruses and worms to infiltrate to the company net-
work. (Perlmutter & Zarkower 2001, 115). 
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3.5 SSL/TLS 
 
The Secure Sockets Layer protocol, later reffered to as SSL, was created by Net-
scape Communications Corporation in 1994. It was first planned to be used for 
securing HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) connections between HTTP servers 
and Internet browsers. The SSL protocol was built to operate on the fourth layer of 
the OSI model called the Transport Layer. Because of this feature, SSL can be 
used to secure all TPC protocol based network traffic; these include many com-
monly used protocols such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, also known as 
SMTP, and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, better known as LDAP. (Mi-
crosoft Technet 2009). 
 
In 1999, the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) released a new standard 
Transport Layer Security version 1.0, later referred as TLS. The TLS protocol was 
based on the SSL version 3.0, which is why differences between these two proto-
cols are minimal. The biggest difference between these two standards is the algo-
rithm used to check data integrity; SSL uses the MAC algorithm, and TLS uses 
the HMAC algorithm. Even though differences between these two protocols are 
miniscule, they are not compatible. (Microsoft Technet 2009).  
 
The TLS protocol is based on four sub-protocols called handshake protocol, 
change cipher spec, alert and record protocol, presented in FIGURE 11. TLS relies 
on lower level protocols like TCP to provide reliable data transport. The hand-
shake layer is used to create and maintain the connection between end-point de-
vices. The Record protocol is responsible for data encryption and fragmenting. 
(Microsoft Technet 2009). 
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FIGURE 11. SSL/TLS protocol layers (Microsoft Technet 2009). 
3.5.1 SSL/TLS Handshake Layer 
 
The Handshake Layer consists of three sub-protocols: the handshake, change ci-
pher spec, and alert protocols. Functions of these protocolas are explained more 
thoroughly in following chapters. (Microsoft Technet 2009). 
 
The handshake sub-protocol is used to negotiate session information between the 
client and the server. The session information includes a session ID, peer certifi-
cates, the cipher spec to be used, the compression algorithm to be used, and also a 
shared secret used to generate keys. The handshake sub-protocol also provides a 
number of important security functions. It performs a set of exchanges that starts 
authentication and negotiates encryption, hash and compression algorithms. (Mi-
crosoft Technet 2009). 
 
The second sub-protocol is Change Cipher Spec, which is used to change the key-
ing material used for encryption between the client and the server. Keying material 
is raw data, from which the cryptographic keys are formed. The Change Cipher 
Spec sub-protocol is used to send messages to the receiving party of the TLS ses-
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sion, saying that the sender wants to change to a new set of keys. New keys are 
computed from the information exchanged by the handshake sub-protocol. (Mi-
crosoft Technet 2009). 
 
The alert sub-protocol is used to send alert messages indicating a change in the 
status of the peer or error in the condition of the peer. The alert sub-protocol in-
cludes a wide variety of alerts to notify the peer of both normal and abnormal con-
ditions. Alerts are commonly sent when the connection is closed. If the message 
cannot be decrypted, or if operation is cancelled by the user, an invalid message is 
received. Depending on severity of the error, the connection might be discon-
nected immediately or the user might simply be notified of the problem. (Micro-
soft Technet 2009). 
3.5.2 SSL/TLS Record 
 
The TLS Record protocol has two main objectives: it checks the data integrity and 
makes sure the data is encrypted. Neither one of these objectives is mandatory, 
both are however recommended to be used. (RFC 2246 – Dierks & Allen 1999, 3). 
 
SSL/TLS Records allow the user to choose whether to use symmetric or asymmet-
ric encryption algorithm. For each TLS session a new unique set of keys is created 
by the handshake layer. In addition, the Record protocol is used to fragment the 
data received from the upper layer protocols. (RFC 2246 – Dierks & Allen 1999, 
3). 
3.5.3 SSL/ TLS session 
 
At the beginning of each SSL/TLS session, handshaking between connecting par-
ties, illustrated in FIGURE 12, takes place. The Handshake protocol is used to 
perform this action. Creating the connection between the client and the server is 
divided into states, which all include changing messages between the client device 
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and the server. After handshakeing is completed all traffic will be encrypted, and 
the connection is secure. (Microsoft Technet 2009). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 12. Handshake protocol messages (Microsoft Technet 2009). 
 
The client intiates the handshake by using a Client Hello message, after which the 
server replies to this message with a Server Hello message. If this is not done the 
the connection will time out. The Client Hello message includes information on 
supported protocols and versions of the SSL/TLS, supported encryption algo-
rithms, supported compression algorithms, session ID, and some random informa-
tion which is used to generate encryption keys. Session ID for a new session is 0. 
(Microsoft Technet 2009). 
 
After the Client Hello packet is received, the server sends the Server Hello packet, 
which includes information regarding the protocol, encryption algorithm, com-
pression algorithm, and the session ID which will be used. The Server Hello 
packet also contains random information that is used to generate encryption keys. 
The Server may also send a Server Certificate to a client; this however is optional. 
Server Key Exchange is only required if a Server Certificate is not used. The 
Server Key Exchange message includes the server’s public key, which can be used 
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to encrypt and decrypt the messages sent to and from the server. The server also 
sends a request for the client certificate and Server Hello Done messages to the 
client. (Microsoft Technet 2009). 
 
After the client receives information from the server it, sends its Client Certificate, 
Client Key Exchange, Certificate Verify, Change Cipher Spec, and Client Finished 
messages to the server. The Client Certificate is compulsory and when used it is 
verified by using a Certificate Verify message used by the client. In the Certificate 
Verify message the client certificate is encrypted with the client’s private key and 
opened by the server with the client’s public key, in order to verify the integrity of 
the certificate. The Client Key Exchange message is mandatory; it uses either Dif-
fie-Hellman or RSA key exchange in order to provide secure exchange of the 
symmetric key used to encrypt the connection between the client and the server. A 
Change Cipher spec message is used to notify the server that the client will start 
using previously negotiated security measures. After the Change Cipher Spec 
message the client sends an encrypted Client Finished Message. After this the 
server sends its own Change Cipher Spec message to the client and encrypted 
Server Finished message. After this all data will be encrypted with negotiated pa-
rameters. (Microsoft Technet 2009). 
3.5.4 SSL VPN 
 
SSL VPN solutions are manufacturer specified systems based on the SSL/TLS 
protocol. In SSL VPN solutions services and resources are normally provided to a 
customer via an Internet browser, so separate client software is not required. This 
gives SSL VPN a leverage compared to IPsec VPN, since in SSL VPN the con-
nection can be made from anywhere in the world, the only requirement for a SSL 
VPN connection is an Internet connection. SSL VPN is normally used for remote 
connections rather than Site-to-Site VPN connections. (Steinberg & Speed 2005, 
33). 
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The SSL VPN solutions currently available on the market provide a much more 
sophisticated and overall security solution than a simple SSL/TLS connection. 
SSL VPN combines the advantages of the SSL/TLS protocol with subsystems that 
allow the user to create a secure session to a single program, rather than the whole 
internal network of a company. Most SSL VPN solutions also provide a wide 
range of security checks, including checking the antivirus program used by the 
client computer, as well as checking if the used antivirus program is up to date. 
Many other checks can also be performed. It is also possible to order a client com-
puter to delete cache files after the session has ended. Because the SSL VPN con-
nection allows the security association of devices over the Internet, it is important 
that the client computer has up to date data security software. Services provided 
by SSL VPN can be granted and/or denied based on information gathered from the 
remote computer, as shown in FIGURE 13. This procedure is called host check-
ing. The SSL VPN administrator has to decide if the client computer which did 
not pass the host check is trusted with any services or if an “unsecure host mes-
sage” is shown to the user. In order for the SSL VPN device to perform a host 
check, installation of the host checker software might be required. It should be 
noted that; installation of this software requires administrative priviledges to the 
computer. (Steinberg & Speed 2005, 70, 71, 74). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13. SSL VPN host check procedure (IT World Canada – SSL VPN 
2005). 
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In addition to network connect, which is an IPsec VPN type secure tunnel between 
the client and the corporate network, SSL VPN also provides a possibility to cre-
ate application based secure connections. Before network connect or application 
based secure connection is formed, the user might be required to install a piece of 
software to their computer. Administrative priviledges are usually required to in-
stall software on the client computer, which may cause some problems for users 
trying to access applications from kiosk computers. It is possible to install a piece 
of software to the client computer, which uses administrative priviledges in order 
to install components required for the SSL VPN connection, even if the user does 
not possess sufficient rights. (Steinberg & Speed 2005, 41). 
 
Application based secure connections are normally done by using port forwarding 
software installed to the client computer by a SSL VPN device. The software in-
stalled to the client’s computer monitors ports and destination addresses used by 
the client. When the software detects that the client is trying to connect the defined 
address and port it sends the information through the SSL/TLS tunnel to the corre-
sponding address located in the internal network of the company. (Steinberg & 
Speed 2005, 47). 
 
In order for SSL VPN to provide HTTP and HTTPS based applications located in 
the intranet of the company, reverse proxying is used. Placement of a reverse 
proxy server in DMZ, also known as demilitarized zone of the network topology, 
is presented in FIGURE 14. A reverse proxy server catches the packets that are 
trying to access the corporate network, and re-routes them to their designated ad-
dresses. (IBM – Secure Remote data access 2003). 
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FIGURE 14. Placement of reverse proxy server in network topology (IBM – Se-
cure Remote data access 2003). 
 
SSL VPN solutions provide two ways of creating network connect between the 
client workstation and the internal network. These ways are called full tunneling 
and split tunneling. While full tunneling is used all the traffic from the client com-
puter is routed through the SSL VPN device. In the split tunneling state only traf-
fic from defined addresses is routed through the SSL VPN device. (Steinberg & 
Speed 2005, 48). 
 
An IPsec-like VPN connection is also one of the many features of SSL VPN. In 
order to achieve this kind of connection SSL VPN device must have named the 
DHCP server which it uses to hand out IP addresses used in VPN connections, or 
use an IP pool definition tool built-in to the SSL VPN device. To make a firewall 
believe that SSL VPN clients are actually clients of the internal network, virtual 
network cards and routing table modification are used. (Steinberg & Speed 2005, 
48). 
 
There are also risks in using SSL VPN connections. The main concerns are inse-
cure client computers used for accessing confidential information on internal serv-
ers. SSL VPN connections are also vulnerable for Denial of Service, also known 
as DoS attacks. This is because SSL/TLS protocols work in upper layers of the 
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OSI model, which makes it impossible to drop packets to lower levels of the OSI 
model. (Wikipedia – Virtual Private Network 2009). 
 
SSL VPN provides many improvements to old IPsec VPN networks. With the 
SSL VPN the user is not bound to the computer or place; SSL VPN can be con-
nected anywhere where there is internet. It also allows the possibility to provide 
only required services to the users, whereas IPsec VPN gives users access to the 
whole company network. SSL VPN is also a PC support friendly solution, because 
it does not require pre-installed client software. It is possible to install client com-
puters with a piece of software that will use administrator priviledges to install all 
applications required by SSL VPN. In addition, SSL VPN provides excellent tools 
for checking security of client devices. SSL VPN allows several other security 
features, such as the possibility to use one-time passwords and checking clients for 
certificate. (Steinberg & Speed 2005, 74, 75). 
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4 AUTHENTICATION 
4.1 Authentication in general 
 
There are different levels of authentication. Weak authentication uses only one 
type of weak authentication method: password, digital fingerprint, onetime pass-
word or certificate. These are considered weak authentication methods because 
they are easy to crack, copy, or duplicate. (Wikipedia – Authentication 2009). 
 
Biometric authentication is considered strong authentication because most biomet-
rics used in authentication are unique and quite hard to counterfeit. When multiple 
authentication methods are used it is also considered strong authentication. 
(Wikipedia – Authentication 2009). 
4.2 Certificates 
 
Certificates are documents used to verify the origin of the messages. In telecom-
munication networks certificates are normally signed by a third party, who vali-
dates the identity of a sender or the source of data. This third party is called cer-
tificate authority, and its actions are explained in following chapters. (Wikipedia – 
Public key infrastructure 2009). 
 
There are two kinds of certificates: trusted certificates that are signed by a third 
party or self-signed certificates. Self-signed certificates are free but they are less 
secure than trusted certificates. How certificates work and advantages and disad-
vantages of trusted and self-signed certificates are explained more thoroughly in 
following chapters. (Wikipedia – Public key infrastructure 2009). 
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4.2.1 Trusted certificates 
 
Public key certificates used in computing are electronical documents incorporated 
to a digital signature which is used to bind a public key and a person’s identity 
together. Public key certificates are managed by Public Key Infrastructure, later 
referred to as PKI, which is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and 
procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital 
certificates. A person in need of certificate applies for the certificate from 
Registration Authority, here on known as RA, who delivers the application to 
Certificate Authority, later referred to as CA, which is usually some Trusted Third 
Party (TTP). CA grants the certificate and also notifies Validation Authority (VA) 
from this new certificate, and when a certificate is used VA is prompted to verify 
authenticity of the certificate. PKI is presented below in FIGURE 15. The concept 
of CA is explained more thoroughly in chapter 4.2.2. (Wikipedia – Public key 
infrastructure 2009). 
 
  
 
FIGURE 15. Public Key Infrastructure. (Wikipedia – Public key infrastructure 
2009). 
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One of the most commonly used PKI applications is the ITU-T standard X.509. 
Amongst other things, X.509 specifies standard formats for public key certificates, 
certificate revocation lists, attribute certificates, and a certification path validation 
algorithm. The structure of X.509 is tree-like, and it uses digital certificates to 
create SAs between the root certificate and users. The system is based on private 
and public keys, and each certificate holder should have one of each. A private key 
can be used to sign or encrypt information and it can only be decrypted or opened 
by a corresponding public key. Information signed with a public key can only be 
opened with a corresponding private key. In order to verify the source of the mes-
sage, private keys should be used to sign messages. (Wikipedia – Public key 
infrastructure 2009; Wikipedia – X.509 2009). 
4.2.2 Certificate Authority 
 
Certificate Authority, also known as CA, is a trusted third party. CA verifies the 
righteousness of its certificates with a digital signature. CA uses a private key of 
the root certificate to sign certificates that are created. Root certificate can be 
signed by CA. CA’s public root certificate can be used to verify the righteousness 
of the certificates signed by CA. (Wikipedia – Certificate Authority 2009). 
 
Certificates signed by CA include the following items: a private key used to sign 
certificates, a public key used to verify documents signed with a private key, ac-
knowledgement of the owner of the certificate, and information about who granted 
the certificate. Also information about the certificate’s best before date is in-
cluded. CAs have a wide variety of different types of certificates, which are suit-
able for different situations. All certificates are used for authenticating a person, 
organization, or other entity. However, certificates used for signing legal docu-
ments are bound by different regulations than certificates used for verifying a 
server name. (Wikipedia – Certificate Authority 2009). 
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The CA business is fragmented, with local providers dominating the home mar-
kets, because many uses of digital signature are bound by local laws, regulations 
and accreditation schemes. The market for the SSL certificates, used for website 
security, is held by a small number of multinational companies, VeriSign being 
the biggest with over 50% share of the markets. (Wikipedia – Certificate Author-
ity 2009). 
4.2.3 Revoking certificates 
 
The most common reason for revoking certificates is compromised security of the 
private key. A certificate revocation list later, known as CRL, is a list of the cer-
tificates already revoked. Users should never accept certificates mentioned on this 
list. If the security of CA’s root certificate is compromised, all certifaces granted 
by the CA should be revoked and renewed. (Wikipedia – Certificate Revocation 
List 2009). 
 
Certificates on CRL have two status options: certificates can be either revoked or 
held. Revoked certificates cannot be re-validated, but certificates on hold can be. 
Certificates with hold status are the ones about which the user is unsure whether 
or not the private key has been compromised. A list of revoked certificates is re-
leased and normally also signed by CA. Signing revocation lists is normally done 
to prevent spoofing or denial-of-service attacks. Even though CRLs are only valid 
for a certain period of time, which is normally less than 24 hours, there are many 
people trying to take advantage of CRLs, which is why it is important for lists to 
be digitally signed. (Wikipedia – Certificate Revocation List 2009). 
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4.2.4 Self-signed certificates 
 
A self-signed certificate is an identity certificate that is signed by its own creator. 
Since self-signed certificates are not signed by TTP, there might be some trust 
issues with using them. For this reason self-signed certificates are mainly used in 
small implementations where people know each other. (Wikipedia – Self-signed 
certificate 2009). 
 
Self-signed certificates offer a secure and free way of authenticating an individual, 
but there are also security risks related to self-signed certificates. The only major 
problem with self-signed certificates is that they cannot be revoked, like certifi-
cates created by CA, so if the security of person’s private key is compromised, 
someone else can use their identity as their own. (Wikipedia – Self-signed certifi-
cate 2009). 
4.3 One time password 
 
The purpose of OTP (One Time Password) is to reduce the risk of unauthorized 
access to restricted resources. This is done by altering the password or part of the 
password every time a person authenticates. There are five types of OTPs that are 
commonly used. The first solution uses mathematical algorithms to generate a new 
password based on the previous. The second OTP solution is based on time-
synchronization between the authentication server and the client. Time-
synchronized OTP solutions normally require some form of a physical hardware 
token such as RSA securID key seen in FIGURE 16. (Wikipedia – One-time 
password 2009). 
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FIGURE 16. RSA SecurID token. 
 
The third OTP type uses mathematical algorithms as well, but is based on a chal-
lenge sent to the user rather than the previous password. The fourth OTP type uses 
password lists printed on a piece of paper or card. These types of OTPs are very 
common in internet banking. The fifth OTP type is also based on challenge and 
response and uses cell phones for delivering passwords for users and then the user 
can authenticate himself by using this password. (Wikipedia – One-time password 
2009). 
4.4 Digital fingerprint 
 
Digital fingerprints are a weak authentication method for devices such as laptops. 
The most common type of digital fingerprint is certificates, but there are also other 
forms of digital fingerprints. A digital fingerprint can be as simple as a windows 
registry value or a file with a certain name stored in certain location. (Juniper 
Networks 2008). 
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Digital fingerprints such as registry values or files can be added by an administra-
tor and then checked by an authenticating device. If values match then authentica-
tion has been successful. Digital fingerprints are generally used to authenticate 
devices rather than people. (Juniper Networks 2008). 
4.5 Biometric authentication 
 
Biometric authentication is considered to be the most secure way of authenticating 
people, even though some applications are more secure than the others. In princi-
ple, biometric samples can be used to recognize individuals quickly, anywhere and 
at any time throughout their entire life. If biometrics were to be used in everyday 
life it would open the possibility to link all the political, economic and social roles 
and behaviours of a person. For example how one behaves as a customer or a ten-
ant could have consequences on his treatment as a seeker of a loan. (Bleumer 
1999, 2, 3). 
 
There are, however, a few issues regarding biometric authentication. Firstly people 
in some cultures can think their soul is stolen if a photo of them was taken for 
biometric authentication. Many people also feel that biometric authentication is 
intrusive, which has prevented biometric technology becoming widely deployed. 
Not surprisingly, the biggest users of biometric authentication are physical access 
control, law enforcement, health care and banking. Computer security and tele-
communications have also increased the use of biometric authentication methods, 
even though these are not the most common places to use biometric authentica-
tion. (Bleumer 1999, 2, 3). 
 
The problem with biometric technology is that it tends to cost more than password 
or token-based systems. However, almost all business laptops sold these days have 
fingerprint scanners installed on them, so it would not be impossible to think that 
using biometric authentication in computers and telecommunications security 
would become more popular. The only question that remains is whether to trust 
the quality of built-in fingerprint scanners of the laptops or not. When applied to 
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the use of VPN or SSL VPN it would also require a company to have a database 
where all the fingerprints would be stored. (Bleumer 1999, 3, 4). 
It is possible to understand if a human characteristic can be used for biometrics in 
terms of the following parameters: 
• Universality - each person should have the characteristic  
• Uniqueness - is how well the biometric separates an individual from 
another.  
• Permanence - measures how well a biometric resists aging.  
• Collectability - ease of acquisition for measurement.  
• Performance - accuracy, speed, and robustness of technology used.  
• Acceptability - degree of approval of a technology.  
• Circumvention - ease of use of a substitute.  
Table 1 shows a comparison of existing biometric systems in terms of parameters 
listed above. (Wikipedia – Biometric authentication 2009). 
 
Table 1. Comparison of existing biometric systems (Wikipedia – Biometric au-
thentication 2009). 
Comparison of various biometric technologies, modified from Jain et al., 2004 
(H=High, M=Medium, L=Low) 
Biometrics:    Universality   Unique-
ness   
Perma-
nence   
Collect-
ability   
Perfor-
mance   
Accept-
ability   
Circum-
vention*   
Face H L M H L H L 
Fingerprint M H H M H M H 
Hand geometry M M M H M M M 
Keystrokes L L L M L M M 
Hand veins M M M M M M H 
Iris H H H M H L H 
Retinal scan H H M L H L H 
Signature L L L H L H L 
Voice M L L M L H L 
Facial thermograph H H L H M H H 
Odor H H H L L M L 
DNA H H H L H L L 
Gait M L L H L H M 
Ear Canal M M H M M H M 
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4.6 Password authentication 
 
Password authentication is the simplest way of authenticating users. In password 
authentication the user is prompted to provide the username and password given 
to him. Password authentication is among the least secure ways of authenticating 
people. This is because many users do not consider it as a security risk if they 
hand their password to husband, child, or even some guy over the phone. Pass-
words are also highly susceptible to hacking, cracking, keyloggers, and other at-
tacks. (Aladdin – VPN Authentication 2009). 
 
Password authentication can be done by adding a static password and username to 
a system, which are then used to authenticate the person. Another way of pass-
word authentication is comparing user credentials with a password database such 
as the Microsoft active directory or the Novell eDirectory. In VPN communica-
tions both types of user passwords are used. Statically generated passwords are 
normally more vulnerable to brute force attacks where a password is attempted to 
be cracked by going through all possible password character combinations in order 
to hack into a system. Password database solutions normally lock the password 
after three to five false positives, after which the administrator might be needed to 
unlock the password. (Aladdin – VPN Authentication 2009). 
4.7 Comparing authentication solutions 
 
Selecting suitable authentication methods for secure remote networking is not 
easy, because users are required to perform strong authentication in order to get 
access to the required software and services. Because of the high cost and possible 
invasiveness of the technology biometrics is out of the question. Digital finger-
prints were tried as authentication method, but they were soon decided to be too 
insecure for enterprise use. 
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Because of the functional AD authentication infrastructure and possibility to use 
excisting AD as authentication method for SSL VPN, AD was made the primary 
authentication method to be used while signing in to a SSL VPN portal. Insecurity 
of password authentication requires two-factor authentication to be used in order 
to receive full access to the company network. Because of this, a one-time pass-
word solution was also implemented to Andritz Group SSL VPN remote access. 
The OTP solution used gives the user the possibility to choose from four different 
OTP technologies. These technologies are password list, time synchronized pass-
word, and mobile token. 
 
In addition to authentication methods, the Andritz Group SSL VPN solution uses 
certificates to authenticate the devices accessing the company network. Certificate 
is checked before authentication and will be used to restrict access to network re-
sources. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of authentication methods 
Comparison of various authentication technologies 
(H=High, M=Medium, L=Low) 
Techniques: Ease of 
use 
Collectability Cost Performance Security Acceptability 
Certificates H H M H H H 
Self-signed 
Certificates H H L M L H 
Password H H L H L H 
Biometrics M M H M H M 
One-time-
password M H L H H H 
Digital finger-
print H H L M L H 
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5  ANDRITZ GROUP AND ITS LINE OF INDUSTRY 
5.1 History of the Andritz Group 
 
Andritz AG was first founded in 1852 by Hungarian entrepreneur Josef Körösi as 
a foundry and machine works. In a couple of years time Andritz had extended its 
product range to cranes, pumps and water turbines. Later also bridges, steam ves-
sels, steam engines and mining equipment became part of Andritz’s product range. 
By the 1870s Andritz employed over 1300 people. In the late 1800s Andritz got 
into trouble because important markets and customers were lost, which in the end 
resulted in Andritz being sold to a group of Austrian iron and steel companies. 
(Andritz 2009b). 
 
In 1900 Andritz was sold to the Gutmann Banking Group and transformed into a 
stock holding company. The new owner managed to gain a large railway tunnel 
contract, and at the same time the company was very successful in building high-
pressure centrifugical pumps and cranes. The bank crisis of 1932 made Andritz 
close its gates, but in the end the company survived the crisis that made so many 
other companies declare a bankruptcy. (Andritz 2009b). 
 
After the bank crisis Andritz changed owners twice before World War II. In the 
end of WWII Andritz’s production machinery was taken away by occupying au-
thorities. This was the second time it looked that the story of Andritz might have 
ended, but instead current owners managed to borrow some second hand machin-
ery and started producing small and medium size pumps and turbines in the old 
buildings. From the 1940s till the start of the 1980s Andritz grew and extended its 
product range to cover electro-chemical and metallurgical plants as well as coolant 
pumps for nuclear reactors. At the beginning of the 1980s Andritz was hit by the 
oil crisis and its effects on the world economy. Over 700 people were dismissed. 
Since 1987 when the company became profitable again it has steadily increased its 
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knowledge and revenue by acquisitions that support the company’s structure. In 
1999 Andritz was sold to a group of investors consisting of President and CEO 
Andritz Wolfgang Leitner and the management. (Andritz 2009b). 
5.2 Andritz Group today 
 
The Andritz Group is a publicly listed company in the Austrian stock exchange. 
The headquarters are located in Graz, Austria. The Andritz Group is a global mar-
ket leader for customized plants, systems, and services for the pulp and paper, 
hydropower, steel, and other specialized industries such as solid/liquid separation, 
feed and biofuel technology. (Andritz 2009a). 
 
Since 1999 the Andritz Group has been making acquisitions around the world to 
support its goal to be a global market leader in areas of pulp & paper, hydro, met-
als, environment & process, and feed & biofuel. The Andritz Group’s main busi-
ness areas are pulp & paper technology with 37% share of the sales in 2008, and 
hydro power business with 33% of the sales in 2008. Today the Andritz Group 
employs approximately 13,700 people worldwide, in previously named areas of 
business. As a publicly listed company another important goal of Andritz AG is 
continuation of profitable growth, which is done by acquiring rising companies 
with good visions and solid economy. (Andritz 2009c). 
 
The Andritz Group’s overall strategy is to be a globally leading supplier of cus-
tomized plants, process technologies, and services with full-line capabilities in all 
of its business areas. Being one of the few players in this field who are able to 
offer this full line of capabilities, the Andritz Group is a strong and respected com-
petitor in its market areas. (Andritz 2009c). 
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5.3 Andritz Oy 
 
Andritz Oy covers the Andritz Group’s operations in Finland. Andritz Oy’s head 
office is in Helsinki and side offices are in Hollola, Kotka, Savonlinna, Tampere 
and Varkaus. Currently over 1,000 people in Finland are directly employed by 
Andritz Oy, and combined with indirect employment, the numbers are closer to 
2,000. Andritz Oy’s chairman of the board is Wolfgang Leitner (Andritz AG) and 
the President and CEO is Harry Rickman, who reports to the members of the ex-
ecutive board of Andritz Group. Andritz Oy’s sister company is Finnish 
Savonlinna Works Oy, which is located in Savonlinna. Total sales of Andritz Oy 
is approximately EUR 500 million annually. (Andritz 2009a). 
 
Andritz Oy consists of 13 divisions and its business is divided to five regions, 
which are North America, South America, North Europe, Central Europe and 
Asia. Following chapters will introduce four of the biggest divisions in Andritz 
Oy. (Andritz 2009a). 
 
The Wood Processing Division is the world's leading supplier of systems, equip-
ment and processes for all steps required in a woodyard - from the arrival of the 
logs to their subsequent preparation into wood chips – all the way to the produc-
tion of chemical and mechanical pulps. The headquarters of the Wood Processing 
Divisions is located in Hollola, Finland. In addition, it has sites in USA, Canada 
and Brazil. (Andritz 2009d). 
 
The Pulp Mill Services Division covers the service activities for the Wood Proc-
essing and Kraft Mill Systems Divisions. Primary emphasis is on production effi-
ciency and availability, services (engineered wear parts, replacement parts, equip-
ment rebuilds, shutdown services, service contracts and upgrades) to kraft pulp 
mills and woodyards supplied either by Andritz or other manufacturers. Apart 
from the traditional service business, the division works with its customers to 
maximize reliability and overall production efficiency, by providing added value 
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services and innovative solutions. The Pulp Mill Services Division serves the 
large installed base of Andritz equipment all over the world. The main sites are 
located in North America and Europe, but there are local service centers in more 
than 30 countries worldwide. The headquarters for the Pulp Mill Services is lo-
cated in Savonlinna, Finland. The Division has approximately 285 employees, 
from whom roughly 50 % in the USA, 40 % in Europe and 10 % in the rest of the 
world. The production facilities for rebuilds and parts are located in Finland and in 
the USA. In addition, the division has local rebuilt partner shops in New Zealand, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, and Portugal. (Andritz 2009d). 
 
The Fiber Preparation Systems Division is a global supplier of systems, equipment 
and services for all papermaking processes such as recycled fiber processing, fiber 
stock preparation, paper machine approach systems, broke handling as well as 
paper mill internal water loop handling, sludge and reject handling. The division 
has its headquarters in Graz, Austria and Kotka, Finland, with significant opera-
tions in Foshan, China, Glens Falls, New York, USA and Tokyo, Japan. (Andritz 
2009d). 
 
The Fiberline Division is one of the world's leading suppliers of systems, equip-
ment, and processes for the production of chemical pulp. The products include 
continuous cooking systems, washers, screens, MC equipment, bleaching systems 
and related equipment. The division is headquartered in Kotka and has operations 
in Savonlinna, Finland; Roswell, GA and Glens Falls, NY, both in the USA; To-
kyo, Japan, Curitiba, Brazil and  Karlstad, Sweden. (Andritz 2009d). 
 
Like all the major companies, Andritz Oy has had mergers, in order to develop its 
business and grow as a company. Within 15 years Andritz Oy has merged two 
times, first with Konewood, and then with GE Hydro Finland in 2006. These 
mergers have made Andritz Oy a considerable employer in Finland with over 
1,000 people employed directly and almost 1,000 people employed indirectly. 
(Andritz 2009a). 
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5.4 Line of business 
5.4.1 Pulp and Paper industry  
 
The global pulp and paper industry is dominated by North American, northern 
European and East Asian countries. Australia and Latin America have also some 
significant pulp and paper industries. India and China are believed to be the key to 
the pulp and paper industry’s growth in the next few years. Andritz Group has 
made some strong investments in previously mentioned regions. (Wikipedia – 
Pulp and  paper industry 2009). 
 
The pulp and paper industry has grown to be a big multinational market, valued 
over $150 billion annually, when in the late 1980s it was worth around $14 bil-
lion. While markets are growing, and even more advanced technology is required 
in order to receive better quality chips, Andritz must be ready to accept the chal-
lenge to meet these new requirements. (Minnes 2009, 1). 
5.4.2 Hydropower industry 
 
Hydropower provides around 19% of world electricity, and it is one of the few 
renewable energy sources. The main source of hydropower are dams built to util-
ize the huge amount of energy released by water when it runs through a water tur-
bine. New more sophisticated and powerful turbienes are planned, in order to util-
ize even bigger amounts of the energy released by the flowing water. (Wikipedia - 
Hydropower 2009). 
 
Andritz Group has made several acquicitions to support its goal to be the market 
leader in the branch of hydropower and turbine technology. Andritz Group’s full 
line of capabilities in this area gives Andritz an advantage to provide everything 
from upgrading the old turbine systems to building whole new systems. (Wikipe-
dia - Hydropower 2009). 
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6 COMPARISON OF VPN SOLUTIONS 
6.1  Check Point VPN 
 
Check Point VPN is an integrated software solution that provides secure 
connectivity to the corporate network, remote and mobile users, branch offices 
and business partners. Check Point VPN provides access control, authentication, 
and data encryption in order to provide users with a secure connection over the 
public internet. In addition, Check Point VPN offers a unified method for creating 
and managing complex VPNs. (Check Point 2009). 
 
In order to define the participating gateways, and to perform other administrative 
tasks, an easy to use administration tool called the SmartDashboard is used. Check 
Point VPN also includes support for third party gateways as well as their own 
products. Check Point VPN supports gateways configured for both star and mesh 
topologies, and configuration of topologies can be done in minutes with an 
integrated certificate authority to manage keys. (Check Point 2009). 
 
A Check Point VPN connection can be created based on either the routes or the 
domain used by the client. In route-based VPNs, the administrator defines the 
traffic to be encrypted by VPN rules, which enables the creation of complex large-
scale site-to-site VPNs in a dynamic environment. Multicast communities across 
VPNs and the extension of dynamic routing are also supported in route-based 
VPNs. (Check Point 2009). 
6.1.1 Enhanced IPsec VPN Security 
 
Check Point VPNs are built to provide VPN connectivity solutions matched with a 
high level of security. Check Point’s IPsec VPN provides secure connectivity 
between remote users, sites, and partners. It also gives an administrator the ability 
to choose what kind of traffic will be affected by the Check Point VPN security 
policy. This can either be encrypted traffic, a specified subset of traffic, or all VPN 
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traffic can also be allowed to enter the company network uninspected. (Check 
Point 2009). 
 
Check Point’s solution also includes strong security against DoS attacks, such as 
ones directed against the IKE mechanism. Preventing the DoS attacks is done by 
asking unknown connecting gateways to solve a computationally intensive 
problem before allocating resources. (Check Point 2009). 
6.1.2 Check Point VPN remote access 
 
Since almost every company has their own unique requirements for the remote 
access, Check Point provides a flexible solution, which allows the customer to 
design a solution to meet their personal needs. Underneath there are some service 
examples provided by Check Point’s IPsec VPN suite. (Check Point 2009). 
• Check Point Endpoint Security—Check Point Endpoint Security is the first 
single agent for total endpoint security that combines a remote access VPN 
with the highest-rated firewall, NAC (network access control), program 
control, antivirus, anti-spyware, and data security features.  
• SecuRemote—SecuRemote is a basic VPN client that offers IPsec 
connectivity for remote users.  
• SecureClient—SecureClient is an advanced VPN client that offers IPsec 
connectivity for remote users.  
• SecureClient Mobile—SecureClient Mobile delivers firewall protection 
and secure, uninterrupted remote access for wireless devices such as 
mobile phones.  
• L2TP (Layer 2 Tunneling protocol) for iPhone—Support for iPhone’s 
built-in L2TP VPN client.  
 
In addition, Check Point VPN offers several ways to avoid the most common rout-
ing and connectivity issues faced by remote users. Check Point’s solution to these 
problems is the use of connectivity modes, such as office mode, visitor mode, and 
hub mode. In office mode IP packets are encapsulated by using the remote user’s 
original IP address, thereby making users to appear as if they were in the office, 
even if this is not the case. In office mode enhanced anti-spoofing is also provided. 
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Visitor mode allows the user to establish IPsec VPN connection in locations 
where Internet connectivity may be limited to HTTP and HTTPS traffic. Hub 
mode provides strict and centralized inspection of all client traffic, while remov-
ing the need to deploy security functions to multiple offices. Hub mode also pro-
vides users with the possibility to use secure client-to-client communications and 
Internet conferencing services, which may require the use of a third party soft-
ware. (Check Point 2009). 
6.2 Nortel SSL VPN 
 
Nortel’s VPN Gateway 3000 series is designed to offer both SSL VPN and IPsec 
VPN services for medium and large enterprises rather than small businesses. The 
Nortel VPN Gateway family has two members. Smaller VPN Gateway 3050 is 
designed to provide services for up to 2,000 concurrent users and bigger VPN 
Gateway 3070 supports up to 5,000 concurrent users. Both of these products are 
designed to provide flexible access options including browser-based, on demand 
and installed SSL clients, and IPsec client support. (Nortel 2009). 
 
The Nortel VPN Gateway offers services quite similar to Juniper Networks SA. 
The Nortel VPN Gateways come with integrated traffic management and content-
based load balancing. Also included in Nortel’s VPN Gateways is improved filter-
ing technology, which allows users to be blocked based on IP address, requested 
URL, application type, or even cookie information. The VPN Gateways perform 
authentication based on local user database, LDAP, RADIUS, NTLM, Active Di-
rectory, or Netegrity. The Nortel VPN Gateways also support using digital certifi-
cates, token-based systems or two-factor authentication as a strong authentication 
method. (Nortel 2009). 
 
In addition, Nortel VPN Gateway products should integrate seamlessly into any 
network, which makes it easy to implement the Nortel VPN Gateway to an excist-
ing network, even if the company had not used Nortel products before. The Nortel 
Web management interface provides easy to use configuration wizards and de-
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tailed help screens, which will guide the administrator in setting up client connec-
tions. Both VPN Gateway products have built-in acceleration features, which pro-
vide better performance and flexibility. (Nortel 2009). 
 
All in all, the Nortel VPN Gateway 3000 series offers combined SSL VPN and 
IPsec VPN solutions for a cheap price and are packed with features. However, 
Nortel have not quite made it to the big league of SSL VPN manufacturers, and 
solutions introduced by Nortel VPN Gateway products have normally been intro-
duced by some of the bigger SSL VPN players before. (Nortel 2009). 
6.3 Checkpoint VPN vs. Juniper SSL VPN 
 
Both Check Point Secure Client and Juniper Networks SSL VPN provide the user 
with an access to the internal network of the company. There are, however, huge-
differences. With Check Point Secure client, connection is made using the client 
software which requires installation. The competitor SSL VPN on the other hand 
is always ready to go, wherever, and on whatever computer. In order to use all 
features offered by SSL VPN, installation of ActiveX components or Java applets 
might be required. Installation of these files requires administrator priviledges. As 
a solution to this Juniper Networks have created software which uses administra-
tive priviledges to install these components on the client computer, even if the 
user had logged in with an account that does not have administrative priviledges. 
 
Both Check Point Secure Client and Juniper SSL VPN support use of one-time-
passwords, AD authentication, and a static user authentication. When it comes to 
device authentication, Check Point Secure Client relies on pre-installed software 
and security of the corporate computers, while SSL VPN provides a wide range of 
authentication methods and security checks, including antivirus check, certificate 
check, checking for corresponding registry entries and many more.  
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The biggest improvement provided by Juniper SSL VPN is, however, the possibil-
ity to grant the user with limited access to the company’s resources. While Check 
Point Secure Client always provides full VPN access for each user, in most cases 
this is unnecessery and can lead to compromised network security. Table 3 pre-
sented below gives a more comprehensive view of the differences between Check 
Point VPN and Juniper SSL VPN. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Check Point VPN and Juniper SSL VPN 
Features Check Point VPN Juniper SSL VPN 
Price 
Excisting system (Firewall and 
management), expensive se-
cure client licences 
Price is determined by the number of  
concurrent users and the platform 
Configuration Command line and  SmartDashboard 
Configuration is done via web browser 
based GUI 
Operation Requires installed client soft-
ware 
Service can be used via web browser, some 
features may require installing ActiveX or 
Java components 
Encryption  
Algorithm 
Depends on used  
configuration 
Encryption algorithm is dependant from 
used web browser 
User  
authentication 
Several ways, supports two 
factor authentication 
Several ways, supports two factor  
Authentication 
Device Authen-
tication Pre-installed software required 
Host checker allows SSL VPN administrator 
to define which security features are  
required before client is allowed to access 
any services or applications 
User groups Each client is treated as an individual 
Clients can be assigned to user groups 
which can be then assigned with services 
and applications required 
Applications Full VPN connection is created 
Client can be allowed to connect network 
resources, web based applications, use a 
single program via SAM, or create Network 
Connect session which can be compared to 
end-to-end VPN connection. 
Troubleshooting Logs Juniper SSL VPN has several tools for  Troubleshooting 
 
6.4 Check Point VPN vs. Nortel SSL VPN / IPsec VPN 
 
Because both Check Point and Nortel are major suppliers in the IPsec VPN mar-
kets. They are able to provide competitive pricing and worldwide support network 
for their remote access products. The main differences between these two products 
are the Nortel VPN Gateway’s ability to combine the best of both IPsec and SSL 
VPN, while Check Point’s product only provides IPsec VPN. The target of this 
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comparison is to see if combining both IPsec VPN and SSL VPN has forced 
Nortel to make some changes to the traditional IPsec VPN connectivity. Differ-
ences between these two are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Check Point IPsec VPN and Nortel IPsec / SSL VPN 
Features Check Point VPN Nortel VPN Gateway 3000 series 
Price 
Excisting system (Firewall and 
management), expensive se-
cure client licences 
New equipment is needed, however Nortel’s 
VPN Gateway 3000 series appliances are 
among the cheapest on the market 
Configuration Command line and  SmartDashboard 
Configuration is done via web browser 
based GUI 
Operation Requires installed client soft-
ware 
Service can be used via web browser, some 
features may require installing ActiveX or 
Java components, Nortel VPN Gateway 
3000 series also provides opportunity to 
install VPN client software to the client 
computer. 
Encryption  
Algorithm 
Depends on used  
configuration 
Encryption algorithm is dependant from 
used web browser 
User  
authentication 
Several ways, supports two 
factor authentication 
Several ways, supports two factor  
authentication 
Device Authen-
tication Pre-installed software required 
Administrator can decide whether to use 
pre-installed client software or do SSL VPN 
type authentication of the client device. 
User groups Each client is treated as an individual 
Clients can be assigned to user groups 
which can be then assigned with services 
and applications required 
Applications Full VPN connection is created 
Client access to network resources can be 
limited by SSL VPN, but full VPN connec-
tion is also possible. 
Troubleshooting Logs Nortel VPN Gateway offers several tools for  troubleshooting 
 
In Nortel’s case combining an IPsec VPN and SSL VPN into one has not affected 
functionality of the IPsec VPN, but SSL VPN has been used to correct the flaws 
and imperfection of IPsec VPN. This makes the Nortel VPN Gateway 3000 series 
a device worth considering for companies trying to combine the best of both IPsec 
VPN and SSL VPN. 
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6.5 Juniper SSL VPN vs. Nortel SSL VPN / IPsec VPN 
 
This chapter compares SSL VPN solutions of Juniper Networks Secure Access 
and Nortel VPN Gateway 3000 series. Solutions are compared mainly on SSL 
VPN level and IPsec features are ignored. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Juniper SSL VPN and Nortel VPN gateway 
Features Juniper SSL VPN Nortel VPN Gateway 3000 se-
ries 
Price Price is determined by the number 
of concurrent users and the platform 
New equipment is needed, however 
Nortel’s VPN Gateway 3000 series 
appliances are among the cheapest 
ones on the market 
Configuration Configuration is done via web browser based GUI 
Configuration is done via web browser 
based GUI 
Operation 
Service can be used via web 
browser, some features may require 
installing ActiveX or Java compo-
nents 
Service can be used via web browser, 
some features may require installing 
ActiveX or Java components, Nortel 
VPN Gateway 3000 series also pro-
vides opportunity to install VPN client 
software to the client computer. 
Encryption  
Algorithm 
Encryption algorithm is dependant 
from used web browser 
Encryption algorithm is dependant from 
used web browser 
User  
authentication 
Several ways, supports two factor  
authentication 
Several ways, supports two factor  
authentication 
Device Authen-
tication 
Host checker allows SSL VPN ad-
ministrator to define which security 
features are required before client is 
allowed to access any services or 
applications 
Administrator can decide whether to 
use pre-installed client software or do 
SSL VPN type authentication of the 
client device. 
User groups 
Clients can be assigned to user 
groups which can be then assigned 
with services and applications re-
quired 
Clients can be assigned to user groups 
which can be then assigned with ser-
vices and applications required 
Applications 
Client can be allowed to connect 
network resources, web based ap-
plications, use a single program via 
SAM, or create Network Connect 
session which can be compared to 
end-to-end VPN connection. 
Client access to network resources can 
be limited by SSL VPN, but full VPN 
connection is also possible. 
Troubleshooting Juniper SSL VPN has several tools for troubleshooting 
Nortel VPN Gateway offers several 
tools for troubleshooting 
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For corporate SSL VPN solutions both Juniper Networks SA and the Nortel VPN 
Gateway 3000 series offer suitable and fully functional applications that can be 
easily deployed to the excisting company network. Both Nortel and Juniper prod-
ucts offer a wide variety of services and clear restrictions to access control. 
 
Nortel is a big player on IPsec VPN markets, but for some reason its SSL VPN 
products have not sold as well as its competitors’ solutions. Because of this Nortel 
might give up providing SSL VPN solutions, which would be problematic if a 
company is using Nortel’s SSL VPN solution.(Girard 2007). 
6.6 Result of comparison 
 
SSL VPN provides superior cost efficiency compared to the old IPsec VPN solu-
tion. Also, it allows more precise user access control required to prevent unauthor-
ized access. SSL VPN also allows users to connect the company network to read 
e-mail and check information from the company’s internal network, from any 
computer with internet connection. Implementing SSL VPN also reduces adminis-
trative overhead caused by supporting the remote users. 
 
The Andritz Group selected Juniper Networks Secure Access product family for 
its new remote access solution. Even though there are several other competitive 
products on the markets besides Juniper’s SSL VPN solution, the decision was 
quite easy. This is because previous co-operation with Juniper Networks has been 
successful, and Juniper Networks were able to provide a complete SSL VPN solu-
tion with required services and worldwide support. 
 
The Andritz Group also used independent research carried out by Gratner to de-
cide which SSL VPN solution would be selected as the Andritz Group SSL VPN 
standard. Based on the independent research Juniper Networks Secure Access 
would be the best solution as the enterprise’s SSL VPN solution, and also based 
on good experiences in the past, Juniper Networks Secure Access was selected as 
the new remote access solution. 
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7 REMOTE ACCESS SOLUTION FOR ANDRITZ GROUP CORPORATE 
NETWORK 
7.1 Andritz Group’s network environment 
 
The Andritz group corporate network is a global full mesh network, which has 
several MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching) clouds with up to 30 sites con-
nected to each cloud. These clouds are connected to each other via MPLS or 
Check Point’s IPsec VPN connections. Globally the Andritz group corporate net-
work has eight main sites which have local MPLS connections between different 
offices in each region. In addition, these sites are connected to each other via 
MPLS and/or site-to-site VPN connections. In total, there are seven long distance 
MPLS connections used to connect the sites. On top of that, there are also over 70 
VPN connections, some of which work as primary lines and some of which are 
back up lines. FIGURE 17, presented below, is a picture of the Andritz Group’s 
global WAN (wide area network). Updates, however, have been made since this 
picture was released. 
 
 
FIGURE 17. Andritz Group WAN modified 
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In addition to site-to-site connections, the Andritz Group has a need to provide 
mobile users with access to the corporate network. To ensure security of the re-
mote access connection, an IPsec VPN or SSL VPN connection is used.  
7.2 Andritz Group’s original VPN solution  
 
Originally the Andritz Group was using Check Point’s IPsec VPN and MPLS lines 
for its secure remote connections. A Check Point VPN is used to provide most of 
the global Site-to-Site connections, and for secure remote connections a Check 
Point secure client is used. Remote users are mainly personnel of the Andritz 
Group, though there are some subcontractors and other business partners who are 
provided with Check Point secure clients so they can connect to the Andritz Group 
intranet. However, granting external users with a full VPN connection can com-
promise the security of the entire internal network, and therefore a new secure 
remote access solution was required.  
 
Since Check Point VPN 1 has proven to be a reliable and easily configurable solu-
tion for site-to-site VPN connections, it will remain as the Andritz Group’s site-to-
site VPN solution. Increased security requirements for company data have created 
a need for new more restricted secure remote access solutions. To find the best 
possible SSL VPN solution for the Andritz Group, several products were tested. 
However, after thorough review one proved to be better than the rest.  Therefore, 
the Andritz Group selected a Juniper Networks SA (Secure Access) SSL VPN 
solution, which was easily manageable, allowed restriction of access and provided 
the required level of security for both user and device authentication. Changing the 
secure remote connection method will also bring considerable savings, because 
SSL VPN licence fees are based on the number of concurrent users, whereas 
Check Point secure client must be installed to each computer that uses secure re-
mote connections, no matter how random this use might be. 
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7.3 Juniper Networks SSL VPN – Secure Access 
 
Juniper Networks SA products offer a complete SSL VPN solution to everyone 
from small businesses to large enterprises. Their products offer a full range of SSL 
VPN services from intranet access to network connect.  
 
The SSL VPN solutions of Juniper Networks SA series introduce several new 
features essential for improving productivity, cost efficiency, and for the mobility 
of remote users. Some of these features are introduced in this chapter. Also cov-
ered in this chaper are Juniper SSL VPN solutions used in the Andritz Group 
global network.  
7.3.1 Juniper SSL VPN requirements 
 
Implementing a Juniper Networks SA device to a company network requires no 
changes to the existing servers or other appliances of the network. Since all re-
quired applications are stored to Juniper SSL VPN’s harddrive, they can be 
downloaded and installed from there over the Internet when the required applica-
tion is used for the first time; therefore no preinstallation of the client software is 
required. 
 
In order to install some of the applications required by Juniper SSL VPN, adminis-
trative priviledges are needed. Because of this, Juniper Networks have created 
software which grants the user with temporary administrative priviledges to install 
an application required by the SSL VPN device.  This software is preinstalled to 
all Andritz Group computers via Microsoft’s software distribution software called 
SMS (System Management Server). 
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7.3.2 Accessing Juniper SSL VPN 
 
Juniper Networks SA appliances provide SSL VPN connectivity over a web 
browser, and therefore no installation of client software is required. Juniper SSL 
VPN is also operating system independent, which makes it easier for companies 
using several operating systems to provide an identical VPN solution for all users 
regardless of the platform.  
 
Since all major web browsers these days are embedded with SSL/TLS support, it 
makes no difference which browser is used to make the connection. Both adminis-
trative web UI (User Interface) and end-user web UI are presented in chapters 
7.5.1 and 7.5.2. 
7.3.3 Juniper Networks IVE 
 
The Juniper Networks Instant Virtual Extranet, later referred to as IVE, is a plat-
form that serves as the underlaying hardware and software for the Juniper Net-
works SSL VPN appliances. The appliances of the Juniper Networks SA series 
allow administrators to set restrictions to control from which IP addresses users 
can access an IVE sign-in page, be mapped to a role, or access a resource. Restric-
tions set for accessing the IVE sign-in page are monitored by the host checker, the 
funtions of which will be explained in chapter 7.3.4. 
 
The IVE is a hardened network operating system and it is used as the platform for 
all products of the Juniper Networks SA series. In order to access IVE, the users 
must have authenticated successfully, and passed the host check procedure. After 
this, the IVE works as a gateway between the client and the internal network. As 
an exception to this, the network connect creates a direct tunnel between the client 
and the internal network. To provide secure connectivity between the SSL VPN 
device, the client, and the internal network, SSL/TLS protocol is used.  
 57 
 
7.3.4 Juniper Networks Host checker 
 
Because SSL VPN makes it possible for users to access confidential and classified 
information resided on the company’s internal servers, via any device with inter-
net connection and appropriate web browser, additional security measures are re-
quired. Juniper has solved this problem by adding a host checker feature to all 
appliances of the SA family.  
 
Host checker is a piece of software which is automatically installed on the com-
puter when it is used for the first time. Host checker is used to perform tests, based 
on which client device can be categorized as safe or unsafe. These tests may in-
clude checking client for up-to-date antivirus software, certificates, registry en-
tries, and other security features. After categorization is done, it can be used to 
determine which resources the client will be given access to. This way it is possi-
ble to restrict permissions given to the client who is accessing the company net-
work from an unsafe source.  
7.3.5 Juniper SSL VPN levels of access 
 
The biggest difference between Juniper SSL VPN and traditional IPsec VPN is the 
possibility to limit access given to the user. Juniper SSL VPN offers three layers 
of connection. The first layer is called core access, which allows the user to con-
nect to internal web based resources and fileshares. After installing an activeX 
component, core access can also provide terminal services, SSH and Telnet con-
nections. The second layer provides a Secure Application Manager, later referred 
as SAM. There are two ways of creating a SAM connection, Java-based and Win-
dows-based. These two can be used together or as separate applications to create a 
SAM session. The third connection option provided by Juniper SSL VPN is net-
work connect, which offers full end-to-end VPN connectivity between the client 
and the company network.  
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The first two layers use a Juniper SSL VPN device as a proxy-like service. This 
means that a connection from the client is established to the Juniper SSL VPN 
device. After the connection has been established, Juniper SSL VPN acts as a con-
necting gateway between the client and the dedicated server residing in the com-
pany’s internal network. This provides enhanced security, since the client is not 
allowed to connect directly to the company’s internal network.  
7.4 Juniper SSL VPN solution for Andritz Group 
 
The Juniper SSL VPN was implemented as a part of the Andritz Group global 
network in 2008, in order to get more restricted access control and easier access to 
the company network. Currently there are two SSL VPNs deployed, one in 
Finland and one in Austria. These devices are administrated separately, yet the 
configurations of these devices should be similar, in order to provide the end-user 
with an identical portal page view no matter which SSL VPN device the user con-
nects to. Since the current version of Juniper SSL VPN does not provide the cen-
tralized management feature, it is hard to keep the pages similar and to do so, lots 
of work is required. A centralized management feature should, however, be intro-
duced in future releases.  
 
Implementing the Juniper SSL VPN to the Andritz Group network environment 
allows resources to be shared based on AD groups. Sharing resources based on 
AD groups has proved its efficiency in the Andritz Group corporate network. The 
use of AD groups reduces the amount of administrative work, compared to main-
taining static user databases locally. Together with Juniper SSL VPN’s built-in 
SSO (single sign on) feature, users will receive a smooth and flexible end user 
experience while operating Juniper SSL VPN. Since the Andritz AD groups are 
defined based on divisions and locations of people rather than software used by 
people, it has been difficult to find suitable AD groups to determine specific roles 
which provide resources (concepts of roles and  resources are explained in chapter 
7.4.1). In order to provide users with required resources, several new AD groups 
have been created. To gain a functional and secure remote access solution, co-
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operation with experts from different fields is required. In the Andritz Group cor-
porate network this means interaction between the network, AD, security, and 
workstation teams. 
 
A high level of security is one of the main requirements for the Andritz Group 
remote access connection. In order to enforce the high level of security a host 
check feature is used on all sign-in realms. In addition, user access to resources on 
internal servers has been reduced from the old days, when IPsec VPN was used. 
The Andritz Group is using a host check to ensure the user is running up-to-date 
antivirus software and device certificates. Without a valid device certificate or up-
to-date antivirus software the user receives only limited resources.  
 
An external user, who does not have the Andritz AD account, will be added to the 
Juniper SSL VPN’s local user database or external one-time-password authentica-
tion server. In addition, all external users are host checked for up-to-date antivirus 
software, to prevent virus outbreaks in the company’s internal network.  
 
To prevent unauthorized access to the Andritz Group internal network, the SSL 
VPNs are configured to require users to provide two factor autentication. Firstly 
users are prompted for their AD username and password, and after successful AD 
authentication the user has to provide either a mobile token sent to their cell 
phone, a password from the password list or a time synchronized password created 
by Mobile Authentication Code Creator application. 
 
Because Juniper SSL VPN is used to support the remote access needs of the An-
dritz Group production network, it is important that systems are redundant and 
backed up in case of hardware malfunction. The Andritz Group’s Juniper SSL 
VPN environment is backed up to a designated server using the archiving feature 
of Juniper Networks SA devices. The archiving feature gives SSL VPN adminis-
trators the possibility to choose which configurations are backed up and how often 
this backup job occurs. Restoring the saved configurations from the backup file is 
an easy and fast procedure In simulated backup restore situations Juniper SSL 
VPN has been fully operational in less than five minutes. The system snapshot 
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feature offered by Juniper Networks SA appliances is a less thorough backup of 
the system config. System snapshot is mainly used for troubleshooting purposes, 
but in some cases it can be used for backing up the system as well. 
 
The complexity of the Andritz Group global network and AD structure provides a 
good testing ground for the Juniper SSL VPN administrator to test the trouble-
shooting tools provided by appliances of Juniper Networks SA series. Policy trace 
is a feature which allows the administrator to track login information, applications 
and services used by single users on single realms. It also offers detailed informa-
tion on how the accessed applications have worked. In addition, Juniper SSL VPN 
offers tools for the administrator to simulate problems experienced by the users. 
Session recording tools can be used to gain detailed information regarding the SSL 
VPN session of the user. Session recording can be done based on username used 
for IVE authentication. Juniper Networks SA appliances also have an interface to 
perfom basic network tests such as ping, tracert, and tcp dump to name but a few. 
The administrator can also print out debug logs, to help with troubleshooting of 
the system. 
7.5 Using Juniper SSL VPN 
 
Juniper Networks SA devices are based on the IVE operating system developed by 
Juniper Networks. After a successful user authentication, IVE is launched. Juniper 
Networks IVE is a clear and easy to use operating system and it is used for both 
administrative and end-user interfaces. 
 
The following chapters will introduce configuring and using of the Juniper Net-
works IVE operating system. Both configuring and using the Juniper SSL VPN 
are covered from both end-user and administrative points of view. 
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7.5.1 Configuration and administration of Juniper SSL VPN 
 
Start up configuration of Juniper Networks SA series SSL VPN is done via the 
console port situated in the front panel of the Juniper SSL VPN device. After ini-
tial configuration is done administration of the Juniper SSL VPN is done via web 
browser. As shown in FIGURE 18, administrative interface is clear and it provides 
the administrator with plenty of information regarding the system. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 18. Juniper SSL VPN administrative web interface 
 
The web browser based management interface is easy to access, from anywhere in 
the network, but it is also a security risk. The devices of the Juniper Networks SA 
series offer a wide variety of solutions in order to prevent unauthorized access to 
the administrative interface. It is possible for the administrator to define an IP ad-
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dress or a group of IP addresses which are allowed to connect with administrative 
priviledges. Another way of preventing unauthorized access to the administrative 
IVE is configuring the Juniper SSL VPN host checker feature with strict require-
ments.  
 
Juniper SSL VPN allows separation of users to realms and roles. Realms are se-
lected while the user is logging into the system. This can be done by creating sepa-
rate sign-in pages for different authentication methods. For example 
www.something.com/ad could be a realm for AD authentication. A single person 
can be listed as the user for several realms, but cannot be signed into more than 
one realm at the time. Even if the user had successfully authenticated to a realm it 
does not mean he would get any resources, since in order to receive resources the 
user must be assigned to a role. Roles can be assigned for a single user or a group 
of users inside the realm. The administrator can choose if the user has to select 
between roles assigned to him, or if resources granted by different roles are 
merged into one bigger set of resources for the user to access. The user can have 
different roles in different realms; this is, however, for the SSL VPN administrator 
to choose. 
 
The SSL VPN administrator can easily add and remove resources and realms for 
each user via a system panel located on the left side of the web UI. This makes 
assigning users to roles and realms and configuring access rights inside these areas 
simple and clear. 
 
In addition, there are several tools for troubleshooting problems encountered with 
SSL VPN. These tools include session simulation, session recording, detailed de-
bug logs, and system snapshots. Each of these can be useful for different kinds of 
debug operations. 
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7.5.2 Using Juniper Networks SSL VPN – Secure Access  
 
Using SSL VPN services is done via a web browser. Since almost every web 
browser available today has built-in support for the SSL/TLS protocol, it does not 
matter which browser is used. SSL VPN login pages can have different naming 
patterns depending on which authentication method will be used, for example SSL 
VPN connection using RSA tokens could be called www.something.com/RSA. 
After connection to a dedicated site has been established, the user is prompted to 
give his username and password. The SSL VPN login page is shown in FIGURE 
19. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 19. SSL VPN login page with two factor authentication 
 
When two-factor authentication is used, the user is required to provide his user-
name and password, after which the user is prompted for a unique one-time-
password (see FIGURE 20). The user has the possibility to choose a desired one-
time-password option from the dropdown list.  
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FIGURE 20. Challenge/response one-time password via text message 
 
After the user has been authenticated successfully, he will be provided with a web 
browser view of the services and applications available for him. A web browser 
view after successful authentication is presented in FIGURE 21. Accessing the 
resources and applications provided via SSL VPN is simple: single clicking the 
link on the main page opens a new web page or starts the application. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 21. Andritz Group SSL VPN main page with strong authentication 
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After the user has successfully authenticated the following services (software, 
websites, fileshares and full network connect) are all just one click away from the 
main page. In addition, the mainpage view is clear and easy to use, which was one 
of the main criteria when the SSL VPN solution was selected. 
7.6 Goals to be achieved by changing remote access method 
 
The primary goal in implementing a SSL VPN solution as part of the Andritz 
Group remote access environment was to limit user access to company resources 
so that only required resources and programs would be provided. Since this kind 
of access limitation could not be done by using traditional IPsec VPNs, new tech-
nology had to be introduced. In addition to access limitation, SSL VPN technol-
ogy reduces administrative overhead caused by installing and maintaining the 
VPN software. In a big multinational company with over a thousand sales repre-
sentatives worldwide, the possibility of accessing data easily over Internet almost 
anywhere in the world was also one of the key features, which gave the SSL VPN 
an edge compared to the original IPsec VPN. 
 
Since the SSL VPN system will be used by Andritz personnel worldwide, it is 
important that systems are redundant and the system can be used on different plat-
forms. Additional requirements for the system included the possibility to use au-
thentication methods configured to the current IPsec solution and a clear, easy-to-
use management interface.  
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8  PROJECT OVERVIEW AND RESULTS 
8.1 Finding a suitable secure remote access solution 
 
Like any other similar project, in order to find a suitable secure remote access so-
lution for the needs of the Andritz Group, comparing different solutions and de-
vices was required. In this project three solutionswere compared: Check Point 
IPsec VPN, Nortel VPN Gateway 3000 series and Juniper Networks Secure Ac-
cess – SSL VPN.  
 
After thorough investigation the Juniper Networks Secure Access – SSL VPN 
solution was selected as the new secure remote access solution for the Andritz 
Group. This was because previous co-operation with Juniper Networks has been 
successful, and because Juniper Networks Secure Access – SSL VPN devices 
were able to provide a complete SSL VPN solution with required services and 
worldwide support, but also because Juniper has superior client based service de-
velopment. 
8.2 Requirements for the remote access solution 
  
The primary goal in implementing the SSL VPN solution as part of the Andritz 
Group remote access environment was to limit user access to company resources 
so that only required resources and programs would be provided. In addition to 
access limitation, SSL VPN technology is used to reduce administrative overhead 
caused by installing and maintaining the VPN client software. In a big multina-
tional company with over a thousand sales representatives worldwide, the possi-
bility of accessing data easily over Internet almost anywhere in the world was also 
one of the key features, which gave the SSL VPN an edge compared to the origi-
nal IPsec VPN. Since the SSL VPN system will be used by Andritz personnel 
worldwide, it is important that systems are redundant and system can be used on 
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different platforms. Additional requirements for the system included possibility to 
use authentication methods configured to the current IPsec solution and a clear, 
easy-to-use management interface. 
 
In addition, frequent changes in used software and the network environment re-
quire the remote access solution to be easily updatable. Changes in the network 
environment are something the company has to prepare for, and downtime caused 
by the change of the network environment can usually be avoided by having a 
redundant SSL VPN system. Problems with incompatible software are to be 
solved in co-operation between the company and the supplier. Providing frequent 
security and service updates is to be done by Juniper Networks. 
8.3 Results of the project 
 
More precise access control provided by Juniper SSL VPN has drastically im-
proved the security of remote networking in the Andritz Group. In addition, there 
is no longer fear of infected remote hosts contaminating the whole company net-
work, because of the additional security provided by the host check feature of Ju-
niper SSL VPN. Clients are already reporting about improved connectivity, which 
is most likely because the traffic between the client and the SSL VPN device is 
compressed. Also, the possibility to access personal e-mails from any computer 
with internet connectivity has received a lot of positive feedback from the clients. 
 
So far the project has been successful, and users have been satisfied with the new 
remote access solution provided by the Andritz Group. In addition, the work-
station team has been pleased with reduced workload, since no new VPN client 
installions have been required. Now it is also possible to perform more precise 
checks for access and user control. Using SSL VPN also provides tools for enforc-
ing security of the client devices. All in all, Juniper Networks Secure Access 
products have found their place in the Andritz Group corporate network. 
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8.4 Future of the project 
 
In the future the Andritz Group is planning to implement centralized management 
for the Secure Access products provided by Juniper Networks. However, this cen-
tralized managent software is still under development (by Juniper Networks). The 
centralized management software Juniper Networks is going to release will work 
with all products of Juniper Networks, which makes it easier for the Andritz 
Group to expand the usage of services provided by Juniper. The future will bring 
several challenges independent from the Andritz Group or Juniper networks, like 
new versions of Windows, requirement for more secure networking and software 
that is not fully compatible with Juniper SSL VPN devices. However, these issues 
can be solved in co-operation with different parties. This allows Juniper to de-
velop their products and the Andritz Group to expand its knowledge of SSL VPN 
solutions. 
 
Because no client software is required, computers consume less energy, which 
allows them to perform longer with a single charging. Reduced energy consump-
tion of Andritz Group computers will help saving natural resources and fight back 
the global warming, possibly saving the world along the way. 
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